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This may be too deep into the weeds for non-Indian/non-Sikh readers, and it's why it's placed as an appendix, BUT it's certainly not too obscure for the volumes written by Indian Sikhs, ALL BLAMING JINDAN!

After Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, the events prior to the Anglo-Sikh Wars were filled with five years of murder, mayhem, and 'trickle-down immorality' on all fronts! So before critiquing Rani Jindan's life in her bedroom, or her role as the inexperienced Sovereign of the Sikhs, while surrounded by murderously ambitious men, against all odds, Jindan and Duleep survived! As the record shows, a stellar accomplishment under the circumstances. The British watched 6 years of anarchy. Sikh Sardars had moved their money to safety with the British. Court Chronicler Sohan-Lal Suri was under British pay—a spy, as was Col. Alexander Gardner. While inciting the soldiers, Gulab Singh Dogra was negotiating to overthrow the Lahore Government that killed his son and nephew and become the independent Raja of Jammu & Kashmir. The state coffers were depleted, the Khalsa Army divisions were fighting amongst themselves, while the French generals simply took leave. So yes, the army had reason to be suspicious of the British gathering supplies across the Sutlej, and to be wary of their dubious leadership. Jindan did some 'plain talking' to the soldiers and tried to cool things down. However untrue, she told the Brits that 'she was in control' and that there was no reason to be threatened. Gen. Sham Singh just threw his hands up and went to Attari, leaving Jindan to the intractably crazed mob! With the country being destroyed from the inside, the men of integrity left in disgust, so obviously, Jindan was not pushing for war! THIS was the reality.

The most quoted 'his-stories' of the Anglo-Sikh war is notably the 1847, "A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore," by Col. G. Carmichael Smyth, who never had any contact with Lahore! He dedicates it to Major Broadfoot, who was eager to retail all the salacious gossip he could get in calling for British intervention in Punjab. Smyth writes in his intro, that although he was requested to write the tale by Maj. Broadfoot, he would not have done so were it not all true!...(While he recorded some crucial details.)

In August 1845 Broadfoot received word from Gulab Singh Dogra that he'd support a British uprising against the Sikhs for the financial reward of retaining Jammu/Kashmir and its surrounding territories. No reply is noted by Broadfoot, who was shot in the heart at Ferozshah on Dec. 21, 1845. BUT we do have Gov. General Henry Hardinge's letters to his wife:

"The man I have to deal with, Golab Singh, is the greatest rascal in all Asia. We can protect him without much inconvenience, and give him a slice of Sikh territory as he is geographically our ally. I must forget he is a rascal and treat him better than he deserves." <https://archive.org/details/ahistoryreignin00smytgoog/page/n15/mode/1up>

We must also mention that history credits Col. G. Carmichael Smyth with igniting the Indian Mutiny of 1857, which brought down The British East India Co., by hanging one man and imprisoning 90 of the regiment for not obeying his orders! Col. Smyth claims that his knowledge of the titillating details of Jindan's history came directly from his good friend, the colorful Scottish-American mercenary Col. Alexander Gardner. Thankfully these vulgar details are not repeated anywhere in 1898's "Soldier and Traveller, The Memoirs of Alexander Gardner: an eyewitness account to the Fall of the Sikh Empire." Published a decade after his death, it was rejected by London in the 1850s as 'too preposterous,' which I elaborate on later...

Carmichael Smyth also admits that: 'Gov. Gen. Hardinge in order to justify British aggression to Lahore's Kingdom, 'wrongly blamed Jindan for sending the Sikhs across the river to their destruction.' He also bluntly states what others of his breed echo, that 'Rani Jindan was not even a wife of Ranjit Singh'! While disparaging Jindan as 'The Messalina of Punjab,' the most profligate woman, who couldn't possibly have birthed the legitimate Sovereign of Ranjit Singh, but fortunately; it still exists in the official court chronicles—Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh:

'On the 23rd of Bhadon Sambat 1895 (6th Sep. 1838 A.D.), the glorious Sahibzada was born of Mai Jindan (Jind Kaur) at Lahore. The sincere near-attendants felt greatly pleased. The said Mai (Jind Kaur) sent the news through Munshi Gobind Ram Sahai, to the Sarkar. The aforesaid person presented himself to the Sarkar and conveyed the blessed news. On hearing the tidings, the Sarkar expressed unlimited pleasure. On receipt of the news, the Raja Khan Bahador (Dhian Singh Dogra), according to the customs of the hilly regions, put fresh things (fruits or vegetables) over the head of

the Munshi. A few days later, gold ornaments such as Hassi and bangles, etc., were given to the Munshi, and he was sent toward Lahore with large sums of money.'

FINALLY, if Jindan was actually in collusion with the British, if she was determined on the army's annihilation, why would she call on the heroic Sham Singh to save the day when the Sikhs were defeated at Ferozeshah? He was the senior chief of the powerful Attariwala family, who was her closest ally, and Duleep was betrothed to his goddaughter. If she was pro-British, why did she refuse to have Duleep put the 'Tilak' on traitor Tej Singh? Why did she not retire to her palace with a gracious pension of 1.5 lakhs and the jewels of the Kingdom? The British had good reason to bring her to their side, if it was possible... Lord Dalhousie wrote:

"She has the only manly understanding of the Punjab, and her restoration would furnish the only thing wanting to render the present movement formidable" (it certainly doesn't sound like Jindan was a British collaborator!!) ➤ Many courtiers lived out their lives retaining their property, receiving large pensions for remaining loyal to British interests. ... but till her last breath, Jindan never did!

'INTERCEPTED LETTERS' Imprisoned in Sheikhpura Fort, Aug. 1847 - April 1849, Jindan sent letters of encouragement to Mulraj and Shere Singh Attari during the 2nd Anglo-Sikh War (along with the location of a crore of rupees to pay the troops):

"I am well and pray for your welfare. A hundred praises on your bravery. I am unable to bestow sufficient commendation on it. As long as the Earth and Heavens exist, so long shall people utter your praises. They quake and tremble through fear of you and have lost all ascendancy. The British have no troops, so exert yourself to the utmost. Give the prisoners you have taken one hundred blows each day, blacken their faces, cut off their noses, and, placing them on donkeys, parade them through your camp. By these means, in a short time, not one British will be left in the land... Do not interfere with the Hindustanees, but by beat of the tom-tom, proclaim that all who enter the Maharaja's service will be rewarded. Collect 1,000-2,000 able men disguised as fakeers. Instruct them to watch the British by day and kill them by night. If you are in want of money, in Sheikhpura you will find a well with a crore and 60 lac rupees —Jai Singh will tell you where it is situated. The British do not molest me at all, being afraid to do so.I will return to you. Make much of few words, Bibi Jind Kaur"

(Known for her letters, whether this letter is real or not—this sealed Jindan's fate! She was sent to the maximum security Chunar Fort, and escaped in April 1849.)



Col. Alexander Haughton Campbell Gardner

The Tartan Turban: A Scots-American at Ranjit Singh's Court A Soldier & Traveller: Memoirs of Alexander Haughton Gardner

So often cited, Alexander Gardner is one of the most relevant and enigmatic characters in evaluating this history. Straight-backed, while clutching his sabre, garbed in tartan from trousers to turban, he topped it off with an egret feather. His beard concealed the hole in his throat that he had to close with clamps whenever he needed to eat or drink....So I would be remiss not to include details of Alexander Gardner's story in ***"The Tartan Turban," an American in the service of Ranjit Singh's Court, by John Keay.***

'Born in Wisconsin, of a Scottish father and Anglo-Spanish mother, he became a mercenary soldier in Central-East Asia. Wealth and survival were his imperatives. With a hole in his throat, one of his many wounds, he dressed in the Rajput fashion of his patron, our anti-hero Gulab Singh Dogra. He is a mysterious and controversial figure. How much of his story is made up can never be known,'
'Gardner's take on events in Punjab was that the bloodletting was master-minded by his employers, the devious Dogra brothers.'

'Contenders for the throne, along with their Chief Ministers came and went so rapidly between 1840-45, listing the causes of their deaths as follows: poisoned, crushed by fallen masonry, stoned to death, shot at point-blank range, beheaded, shot in the back, massacred by their troops, strangled, and cut up for fish-food—they were all assassinated! Five Maharajas and four Prime Ministers rose and were felled in five years, leaving a 6-year-old child, who is probably not of the Royal Blood, leading to further contestation of the throne.'

Gardner accompanied the Dogras on the raid that began all the carnage, and he personally blew up protectors of Lahore's treasure, thus saving the day for Gulab Singh. Because of his qualities, he was later assigned to protect Rani Jindan and the Court, ➤ while acting as a British informant for Henry Lawrence and reporting to him on all the events in Lahore...

The British spy Alexander Gardner: 'saw more than he remembered and remembered more than he saw.' George MacDonald-Fraser credits him as his source for "*Flashman & The Mountain of Light*," and what has been widely published as gospel, even though his first version was rejected by London as *too preposterous!* "*A Soldier & Traveller*" reads like a "**James Bond Novel**," yet Gardner's telling is called '**An Eyewitness Account of Fall of the Sikh Empire**' that was further embellished by Smyth with the spiciest anecdotes committed to ink in "**The Reigning Family of Lahore.**"

Alexander Gardner's 1898 "A Soldier & Traveller" description of the death of Rani Jindan's brother, Wazir Jawahar Singh:

'Raja Gulab Singh now thirsted for vengeance on the Sikh nation, which had killed so many members of his family. Gulab set terms for himself with the British, plotting to leave the Sikhs to their doom. Raja Jawahar Singh especially incurred his wrath for the deaths of Hira and Sohan Singh. 'Jawahar was completely intoxicated by his sudden rise to power, and in the exuberance of his heart, began to ill-treat Kashmira and Peshora Singh, two adopted sons of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

*(*instigated by Gulab on both sides) This was enough to cause the army to feel furious indignation—any favorite of the old Maharaja was sacred to them. Kashmira and Peshora Singh were shortly afterwards killed, the latter under atrocious circumstances of cold-blooded treachery. The Council of the army deliberated for fifteen or twenty days. Jawahar Singh was in the fort and dared not show his head: menacing news reached him daily. The Council at last closed deliberations and decided that Jawahar should be slain, and then the army should march down and attack Delhi.*

'On September 21, 1845, Jawahar Singh was summoned before the army. He came out on an elephant, holding his nephew in his arms, the young Maharaja Dhulip Singh, the last survivor of the line of Ranjit Singh. The Maharani Jindan accompanied him on another elephant. Jawahar had an escort of 400 horsemen, and two elephant-loads of rupees with which to tempt the army.

'Dhulip Singh was received with royal honors: his mother, Maharani Jindan, in miserable terror for her brother, was seated on her golden howdah, dressed in white Sikh clothes and closely veiled. As soon as the procession reached the middle of the line, one man came forward and cried out, "Stop," and at his single voice the whole procession paused. Four battalions were now ordered to the front and removed Jawahar's escort to a distance. Then another battalion marched up and surrounded the elephants of the royal personages. Ten of the Council then came forward; the Rani's elephant was ordered to kneel down, and she was escorted to a small but beautiful tent prepared for her. Then a terrible scene took place. The Rani was dragged away, shrieking to the army to spare her brother.

Jawahar Singh was next ordered to descend from his elephant. A tall Sikh slapped his face and took the boy. He lost his head, attempted to parley, and a tall Sikh slapped his face and took the boy Dhulip Singh from his arms, asking him how he dared to disobey the Khalsa. Dhulip Singh was placed in his mother's arms, and she, hiding herself behind the walls of her tent, held the child up above them in view of the army, crying for mercy for her brother. Suddenly, hearing a yell of agony from a well-known voice, she flung the child away in an agony of grief and rage. Fortunately he was caught by a soldier, or the consequences might have been fatal.



Duleep Singh Durbar c.1843

'Meanwhile the bloody work had been done on the hated Minister. A soldier, who had presumably received his orders, had gone up the ladder placed by Jawahar's elephant, stabbed him, and flung him upon the ground, where he was despatched in a moment with fifty wounds, did the Sikh army avenge the death of Kashmira and Peshora Singh....

'Maharani Jindan now became regent, and with her lover Lal Singh, who was appointed her adviser, decided on a policy of aggression. That policy was indicated by the old Sikh motto, "Throw the snake into your enemy's bosom," which is even more forcible than the English, "Kill two birds with one stone." The snake was the

evilily disposed, violent, yet powerful and splendid Sikh army. It was to be flung upon the British and so destroyed. Thus did the Rani Jindan in her turn plan to avenge herself on the murderers of her brother Jawahar Singh.'

... Seriously!?! Well past his carrying size, a 7-year-old 50 lb., boy was 'flung' over a tent wall, by his sari-wearing 110 lb. mother?... **PREPOSTEROUS!**



Published 1898, 20 years after his 1877 death, Alex Sahib's description is wildly contradictory...It says Jawahar was told to descend the elephant, his face slapped, and Duleep taken from his arms, while Jindan was escorted to a beautiful tent. (The Rani always had an entourage of attendants and guards with her—as was normal.) Then he says: *'Jindan was dragged away screaming, begging for mercy for her brother, then held Duleep up above the walls and 'flung' her young son out of the tent—but thankfully Duleep was caught by a soldier, or the consequence might have been fatal.'*

This is just one example...**Alexander Gardner 'saw more than he remembered, and remembered more than he saw.'** Most reports say that Duleep was taken away by the soldiers, and kept for some time, while Jindan was guarded, afraid of what she might do in her distress. Be that as it may, the details are wildly embellished, and conveniently — **once again, Jindan is blamed!**

Chapter XV ... the most well propagated story

After the murder of Wazir Jawahar Singh, his sister, the Rani Jindan was declared Regent. Her principal advisors were Diwan Dina-Nath, Bhai Ram Singh, and Misr Lal Singh, the first named was a man of remarkable talent known as "The Talleyrand of Panjab." ... When war was declared against the British, and the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej I was acting as Raja Gulab's agent and factotum at Lahore, and in consequence had great power and influence.

Two more contemptible poltroons than the two generals of the Khalsa army— Lal and Tej Singh, both Brahmans—never breathed. Lal Singh ran away and hid for twenty Days in an oven at Ludhiana, in which the Sikhs would have baked him, if they had caught him. Tej Singh always kept at the apex of the army (in the rear), pretending that he could thus have an eye on both divisions, and that it was not his duty to go in front. Tej Singh was never trusted by anyone.

... After the start, Lal and Dina Nath, used to receive visitors, and a succession of picnics took place at Shalimar Gardens.—The Rani's policy was to affect enormous anxiety for the success of the Sikhs, but to afford them no substantial aid. If Delhi was taken, then so much more the glory and loot; if the British were victorious, the Rani who was in correspondence with them, could trust to their protection.

The pusillanimous and ignominious departure of Avitabile and Ventura, at this critical juncture, much disgusted the army, who wanted efficient and civilised control. There was no necessity to leave that I saw. I was always treated with honour and respect .

The state of the army was such that prescription rolls were such that all individual obnoxious to them had to be given up! I started out with the army but was recalled by the Rani to Lahore, and she specially insisted that I was wanted to hold Lahore against the Khalsa. I was privately told to bring back no Sikhs but as many Musselmans as I had with me. The very brigade which mutinied at Peshawar in 1841. The Muhammadans hating the Sikhs were enchanted at the recall, and I was as it were, governor of Lahore. My orders were simple: "No Sikhs were to return," Manage that, and all the rest shall be as you like. More fear of maltreatment by the Sikhs was entertained than by the British.

...The resolve of their ruler to destroy the Sikh army by whatever means was known by the army itself , but such was the hopes of loot from Delhi, such the belief that the intentions of the British were aggressive, such the domestic incitements of their families to plunder, and such their belief in their mystic faith, that one dogged determination filled the bosom of each soldier. ... "We shall go to the sacrifice!" One deserter was near beaten to death by his Panjabi countrywoman.

The only duty imposed on me was to protect Maharani Jindan, and her child, and to get the dread Khalsa army destroyed somehow. "Don't come back, gallant men of the 'Guruji' said we, "without at all events seeing Delhi."

(... We all foresaw, those not intoxicated by religion and drink, that the British unity of council, must in the end win.)

Lal ran away from Mudki: he preferred the embrace of Venus at Lahore, to the triumphs of Mars; and was as all Brahmans, held in the highest contempt by the Sikhs. He hid in a bakery in Ludhiana. The Rani Jindan led him a dreadful life at first, when he returned to Lahore after twenty days absence, jeering at his cautious behaviour, but he being her favorite, orders were given to stop the hilarity. Even to Tej the army cried, "Do not betray us!" ... such was his character for treachery. ... He declared he was panting for war but his Brahmin astrologers would not let him out of his hut.

All of this time Gukab Singh, who could have sent 40,000 men by a sign of his finger, was implored by the Sikhs to come to their aid. The army offered to make him (Dogra though he was) Maharaja, and to kill the traitors, Lal Singh and Tej Singh. ... He remained firstly at Jammu, the Rani telling him not to stir unless she required him. meanwhile Gulab cajoled the leaders of the Sikh army, to see every visitor, whether in the bath or eating, as if his whole heart was with the Sikhs. ... He got all the wheat carriers in the country, loaded them with an immense display, with about a fourth of the amount they could carry, with placards in 'Gurmukhi' on their necks that they were carrying supplies from Gulab Singh.... And not to ride two-abreast, so that the country might imagine that enormous supplies were being forwarded to the stalwart Khalsa by their loyal and affectionate friend. "I'm not going empty handed to the Great campaign that is to end in Calcutta," gave out Gulab Singh. "This will be a long War," said he. "It's a race to the Capitol and the devil catch the hindmost."

When, after the defeat at Sobraon, February 10, 1846, the remains of the Sikh army moved from Jammu, and I went to meet him. "How is her Majesty?" said he, his first words. I went with him to Maj. Lawrence. I had about 500 men and Gulab had 2,000 with him and 20-30,000 within hail. Of course Gulab had a double move, and Lawrence was anxious of a military mistake, of moving British troops between the strong though beaten and a fresh body with a doubtful course of policy.

...A very dramatic scene took place between the battles of Ferozehah and Sobraon. The Sikhs were literally starved for want of rations. They sent a deputation of 400 picked Sikhs to Lahore to urge the dire necessities of the army — for three days they lived on grain and raw carrots. The Rani at first would not allow the deputation to enter Lahore. She feared justly for her personal safety at the hands of these desperate men. I placed four battalions of infantry over the queen, and she at last consented to hold a durbar and receive the deputation. They were told to come armed only with swords. I turned out a large guard for the queen who waited behind a screen for the arrival of the envoys. I was standing close to the Rani and could see the gesticulations and move-

ments of the deputation. In answer to the loud complaints to which the army was exposed, she said that Gulab Singh had sent vast supplies. “No, he has not;” roared the deputation, “we know the old fox, he has not sent breakfast for a bird!” ... Further parley ensued, the tempers of both parties waxing wroth. At last the deputation said, “Give us powder and shot.” At this I saw movement behind the purdah (little Duleep was seated in front of it). I could detect that the Rani was shifting her petticoat; I could see that she stepped out of it, and then rolling it rapidly into a ball, flung it over the screen at the heads of the angry envoys, crying out; “Wear that, you cowards! I’ll go in trousers and fight myself.”---The effect was electric!

After a pause on which the deputation seemed stunned, a unanimous shout arose, “Duleep Singh Maharaja, we will go and die for his kingdom and the Khalsaji!” And breaking up tumultuously and highly excited, the dangerous deputation dispersed and joined the army. ... The courage and intuition displayed by this extraordinary women under such critical circumstances, filled us all with as much amazement as admiration.

It cannot be ignored that “A Soldier and Traveler” was published in 1898 in London, **20 years after Gardner’s death**. He was a colorful character and author, and so, while becoming the official record, the truth may never be known. Alex Sahib was exiled to British territory, where at leisure he recounted his tales to G. Carmichael-Smyth, written in his 1847: “A History of The Reigning Family of Lahore.” After the wars, Gardner officially entered the service of Gulab Singh, who bestowed a comfortable income for him. He died in Kashmir at 92 years.

***I shudder to think what propaganda will be considered HISTORY in our new age of AI-generated videos and ‘Fake News’...**

**Soldier and Traveller Memoir of Alexander Gardner, Col. of Artillery
In the Service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh**

<https://archive.org/details/soldiertraveller00gardiala/page/246/mode/1up>

The Tartan Turban: A Scots-American at Ranjit Singh’s Court

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0P9huEbyhCQ>

(1847) A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore: With Some Accounts of the Jamoo Rajahs, the Seik Soldiers and their Sirdars

By George Carmichael Smyth

<https://archive.org/details/ahistoryreignin00smytgoog/page/n19/mode/1up>

Some Original Sources of Punjab History

“WAQAI I JANG I SIKHAN” / “WAQAI JANG I PHEROSHAHR”

Narrative of the Battle of Ferozepore, Author: Dewan Ajudhia Parshad

<https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.282842/page/n55/mode/1up> pp 51, 52-77

Dewan Ajudhia Parshad, an eminent state official since the days of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, observed the political developments in the Panjab at very close quarters and had ample means to collect first-hand information about events in the country.

As explained in the beginning of the accounts of Pheroshahr and Sobraon the narrative is mainly based on his own knowledge and on reports from notable persons who were present on the spot. Thus on the whole the record may be treated as eye-witness evidence. The keen observation of the author and his description of many out-of-the way details have rendered the account all the more valuable. As an original and authentic narrative of events of out-standing importance the manuscript is a rare record of the closing years of the Sikh rule in the Punjab.

*It is all the more important, since even in Umdat-ut-Tawarikh, the only other reliable Sikh history in Persian which deals with the period, the account of the first Sikh war is unfortunately omitted. The account of the Sikh war from Katik to Phagan, 1902 B. E. (October 1845 to February 1846) ➤ was lent by Lala Sohan Lal to Sir Herbert Edwardes at his meeting with him, but was not returned to the author (*see Umdat ut Tawarikh Vol IV, iii. p. 88.)*

No other known source gives such an exact and impartial account of the anarchy which prevailed in the Kingdom of Lahore; of the circumstances and events which led to the First Sikh War; and of the campaign as viewed from the Sikh side. It will modify several of the statements made by standard historians upon these subjects. For example, the writer makes it plain beyond any doubt, that the commanders of the Khalsa army, such as Sardar Tej Singh and Raja Lal Singh, had scarcely even nominal authority; that the officers were solidly opposed to the violation of the Sutlej frontier and

bore no responsibility for the subsequent campaign; that, contrary to one common belief, > RANI JINDAN HAD OPPOSED AND NOT INSTIGATED OR CONNIVED AT THE MELANCHOLY ADVENTURE; that all power, military and political, had passed to the insubordinate army and was exercised by the groups of ignorant, reckless demagogues, which formed the “panches.” The document shows, in short, that the Khalsa Kingdom was destroyed by the Khalsa army.

An account of the insolence and insubordination of the Sikh troops at Lahore: account of the Fauj-i-Khas till the day of defeat at Pheroshahr, based on the personal knowledge of the author."
Sardar Ram Singh was also with the Fauj-i-Khas.

(*The **Fauj-i-Khas** was a brigade of the **Fauj-i-Ain** section of the Sikh Khalsa Army of Punjab. It consisted of very experienced elites and had a separate flag and emblem. It was strictly disciplined in the French pattern. All the equipment and weapons were of the best type. It grew to be the best organized section of the regular army.)

The whole narrative is based on the version of Sardar Ram Singh and Sardar Mehtab Singh. The description of the battle at Mudki is entirely attributed to S. Ram Singh and S. Mehtab Singh who accompanied the Sikh troops. The rest of the narrative is drawn from various reporters:

After the death of the great Maharaja Ranjit Singh Bahadur the condition of the Punjab deteriorated irretrievably. Disorder, bloodshed and fighting ensued. The leading Sardars formed factions. After Maharaja Kharak Singh and Kanwar Naunihal Singh had passed away, the Sardars and the higher officers began to struggle among themselves for power.

The army too, deteriorated as it felt itself master of the situation. This decadence was manifest to all. The administration of the state grew worse from day to day. On the 8th Asij, 1902 b, e. (22nd September, 1845) outside Lahore on the plain towards Mianmir the Sikh army murdered Sardar Jawahar Singh upon the suspicion that he had instigated the murder of Peshora Singlh in the fort of Attock by Sher Singh Attariwala. After that the Sikh troops became completely self-willed. Moved by insolence and avarice, they abandoned

themselves to unrestrained violence, which disintegrated the state.

The people were put to hardship; revenue was difficult to be realized and anarchy prevailed on the Frontier. The troops who gathered (at Lahore) at Dussehra (1845 a.d.) increased this confusion.

The Rani ordered the Commander, the brave and resolute Sardar Tej Singh, after his return from Peshawar to restore discipline in the Fauj-i-Ain to its state during the reign of the great Maharaja. The Sardar announced to the Sikh army that order could be maintained only if they would return to the obedience they had observed in the time of the Great Maharaja. Raja Lal Singh controlled political affairs and the irregular troops, but he was afraid of the Fauj-Ghair-Ain. At the time of the murder of Jawahar Singh he was imprisoned by the army, together with Sardar Attar Singh, Dewan Dina Nath and Khalifa Nur-ud-Din. Despite the best efforts of the Raja to perform this onerous two-fold task the *Fauj-i-Ain* became more insolent than ever. The Sardars were seriously frustrated in the administration of the country. *Kinsmen of soldiers refused to pay the taxes with the excuse that more than enough revenue had already been collected or that their own receipts had become very little. If a report was lodged against them at Lahore, some members of the army maintained their cause. Often a gang of soldiers arrested a Sardar or his agent and wrested from him the dues which he had managed to realize on the plea that the taxpayer's produce had not been adequate, or that the balance of their pay was to be adjusted. Only such Sardars escaped this high-handedness as had friends among the troops but those 'benevolent' soldiers required a 'fee' from the Sardar.*

Political administration was rendered equally difficult, since the soldiers, who were kinsmen of the subjects and belonged to the same stock, had become quite uncontrollable and insolent and perpetrated all kinds of atrocities, fomenting civil strife. If some Amin or Munshi was appointed (to decide a case) he labored under one of two handicaps: either he was himself implicated with one of the parties or the other party refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the men sent by the Sarkar. They were encouraged in their defiance by the fact that they had kinsmen in the army. Even after a decision had been

given in a case, the parties concerned came to Lahore with their supporters, and reopened the case, relying upon the military officers who supported them to oppose the supporters of the other party, utterly regardless of the facts of the case.

If an agent of the Sarkar was sent to serve a summons, he was seized by a gang of soldiers on his return and was deprived of any fees realized in terms of the summons. *If he handed over the money willingly, all went well; if he refused or resisted, he was beaten for doing his duty; but in either case the money was snatched from him. Such deeds created anarchy and disaffection in the country.*

If a subject paid his dues, he made the Tehsildar (the revenue officer) feel obliged to him for the favor, saying that he had not made false: 'excuses' like such-and-such persons, and he expected favors in the people who had no relation in the army were left lamenting that in their helplessness they had to pay their taxes. Thus the collection of revenue became daily more difficult. From every side the Sardars complained about the refusal of persons to pay their dues to the Government, which made administration impossible.

The inhabitants of the cities were also much troubled by the Singhs who demanded most unfair rates for the purchase of commodities. In the lanes and bazaars they pried through doors and loudly threatened to break them with their axes, promising reprisal for resistance. They declared that the citizens were fortunate that Sardar Jawahar Singh had willingly accompanied them, when they withdrew to the area between the city and cantonment. If he had not then he'd been killed in revenge for the murder of Peshora Singh, they said, they would have forced their way into the fort and despatched him on that same day and would also have plundered the city. They boasted that the wealth of citizens was the Singhs for the taking. And none dared gainsay them.

A small group of Sikhs, for example, went to a simple shopkeeper and offered him a few pies for some loaves said to have been bought from

him the previous day and required the return of the security of one rupee left with him. The shopkeeper was taken by surprise. Upon protesting mildly, he was beaten without reason. Some of the Singhs posed as witnesses for the others and extorted the sum demanded. Fortunately for the shopkeeper, a more kindhearted Sikh appeared on the scene and induced the others to leave the poor fellow, saying that they had apparently mistaken him for some other shopkeeper. He said that the shopkeeper was a reputable man and that someone else might have taken it from him, and appealed to them to leave him in peace. The timorous shopkeepers were terrified by such experiences and either kept their shops closed or kept very few goods in them.

In the cantonments, too, there was no semblance of discipline or order. The soldiers, after receiving their pay, absented themselves without leave from the Sarkar. They arranged it among themselves and went to their homes to deposit their pay. Parades took place in name only. Some of the troops had gone home; some were absent in the city; and some had gone to settle private quarrels. Not more than a quarter of the total number appeared at the time of parade. No sergeant dared call the roll. The officer of the matchlock-bearers could not order the change of guard. The officers, in fear of their lives, quietly submitted to the will of the troops. The number of troops present on each day was regularly recorded, but these numbers, excluding those who had got leave from the Sarkar were rarely found to tally with those on the rolls.

On pay day the soldiers picked bright new coins from the heaps of money in exchange for defaced ones and threw away the worn coins, saying that they could be given to the officers. Because of these practices the treasury at times ran short of cash. Balances and increases due were taken from the Daftaris and in disputes, until the matter was referred to the Sardar the accountants were held responsible by the men.

The soldiers got their brothers, sons and relations enlisted without orders or identification, simply declaring that so-and-so was enlisted at such a place.

By their orders the wearing of caps by 'Poorbeah' troops and regimental

bandsmen were forbidden and such men were required to use turbans. If an officer forbade such insubordination some troops would expel him while others, who liked him, would recall him and beg him to defer to the wishes of the Khalsa; *so the officers were at their wits' end*.

The Fauj-i-Khas consisted of four battalions forming two regiments, with horse batteries and *Jinsi*. It was trained by Generals Allard and Ventura, the French Officers.... During the disorders, which followed the death of the Great Maharaja till the days of Sardar Jawahar Singh, it took its orders from the political leaders and often acted against the wishes of the rest of the army. By the orders of these political leaders the *Fauj-i-Khas* was kept at Lahore and were entrusted with the most responsible tasks, such as guarding the magazine, the treasury at Moti Mandar and the city gates. The disciplined behavior and loyalty of the *Fauj-i-Khas* led to some improvement in the rest of the army. After the murder of Jawahar Singh the *Fauj-i-Khas* was off duty. The men of the other regiments conspired among themselves and when the *Fauj-i-Khas* reassembled, they stated that for some years the *Fauj-i-Khas* had been stationed at Lahore and should be sent with its commanders on active service to Peshawar. The soldiers belonging to the *Fauj-i-Khas* replied to their critics that they were prepared to accept the proposal if the services performed by the *Fauj-i-Khas* since its formation were found inferior to those of the rest of the army. They had occupied Dera Ghazi Khan, had conquered Mandi and Kamalgarh and other places. They would also accept the proposal, if the periods of their stay at Lahore and near the capital were considered since the capture of Peshawar. The soldiers of the rest of the army appealed to the to transfer the *Fauj-i-Khas* to Peshawar. Their request was granted and an order was issued that the banners of the *Fauj-i-Khas* should be taken across the river Ravi. The Sikhs of the *Fauj-i-Khas* saw the letter containing the orders for their transfer to Peshawar, and felt much aggrieved. They alleged that their officers had been bribed to agree to the transfer—a charge such as had not been heard for years. They declared that the officers of the *Fauj-i-Khas* had always told their men that they would be posted at the seat of Government, in preference to the troops of the rest

of the army and that this privilege would always be theirs. But when they received this order of transfer, it became clear that the officers were guided by selfish motives and had betrayed their men. They proposed to collect in a house near Anarkali, straw matting and wood from adjoining houses, set fire to it and burn their officers in it. The officers adjured them to maintain the discipline and loyalty which would spread their reputation throughout the world; that they (officers) would share the fortune of their troops in the transfer to Peshawar; and that their lives were in the hands of their men. The men replied that they would not be deceived by the false pretext of the officers. They said that they were in the same position as their Sikh brethren. At Peshawar there was no enemy to be faced, no expedition to be undertaken. About this time a news-letter was received from Rai Kishan Chand, announcing that, *in view of the general disorder in the Punjab, the British said that Sikhs all over the Punjab had gone mad, had set their house on fire, and their neighbors feared that the fire might spread to their own houses. Consequently the English Company decided to strengthen the frontier.*

News from Ludhiana told that at Nandpur, a trans-Sutlej possession of the Lahore Sarkar, a dispute had taken place among the Sodhis about some property, causing bloodshed.

Najib Khan, Risaldar of the Muslim regiment, who had gone there to put down the disorder, had been killed. The Lahore Sarkar could not control the situation. Since Nandpur was a place of pilgrimage of the Sikhs, and the Jagirs of the Sodhis were situated close to it; and since the Sodhis had begun to collect men the Sarkar of the Company stationed the forces of a hill Raja near Nandpur, in order to settle the dispute and to stop the gathering of the Sikhs in the town and the villages in the of the Sodhis. And as a measure of prudence the Sahibs enquired why a body of Sikh troops of the Lahore Sarkar had been staying in a certain village across the river Sutlej. (Sodhi (Punjabi: ਸੋਢੀ) are landlord people from Khatri or Kshatriyas clan from the Punjab region.)

On receiving this news the real well-wishers of the State of Lahore were perturbed that the confusion and disturbance created by the stupid

and short-sighted Sikh soldiers and their defiance of the governing authority had caused disorder on the frontier and had aroused suspicion.

There had been a time when the glorious Sahibs had themselves sought military help in the campaign of Khorasan and had felt fully satisfied with the attitude of the Lahore Sarkar.

Again, the late Maharaja was so confident of the abiding friendship of the English, that during the apprehended invasion of Peshawar, when Dost Muhammad Khan had personally led large forces for its recapture, he had marched to Peshawar with all his troops and guns leaving less than one-tenth of his forces in the rest of the Punjab, withdrawing troops even from the garrisons of the forts. As a result of the firm and stable friendship of the Company, all had gone well in the Punjab. But now the insubordination of the soldiers, on top of their earlier misdeeds had brought the administration to confusion. ... *None, great or small, dared admonish them for their indiscipline for fear of losing honor and life.*

The army declared that the British had no right to administer the trans Sutlej possessions of the Lahore government. What had happened at Siri Anandpur might occur elsewhere also.

It was learnt from Poorbeahs (sepoys) who came from Hindustan that British troops were being continuously moved up to Ludhiana. They (the Sikh soldiers) *suspected from this that those at the helm of affairs at Lahore were in league with the British. That the Maharani nursed a grudge against the army on account of the murder of her brother, Sardar Jawahar Singh.*

They would not let the state of Lahore slip from their hands. Extracts from their scriptures were being circulated by the Nihangs, the Akalis, and Granthis, to the effect that *the Sikhs would rule from east to west and that they would occupy the throne of Delhi.* In Hindi they declared (verse): *“The army of the Guru shall sit on the throne at Delhi; the fly-whisk shall be waved over its head and it shall have everything according to its desire.”*

Further they said that battle against the British was as sacred to them as bathing in the holy Ganges and would be in full conformity with the

tenets of their religion. They said that they did not love their present leaders as they loved the old. They would bring back Raja Gulab Singh and make him Wazir. *It became apparent that the whole Sikh army had taken the evil path. The plans of the British for the defense of the frontier were suspected to be a cloak for the occupation of the Cis-Sutlej possessions of the Lahore government and the troops believed that the State of Lahore had made a secret arrangement to this effect with the Company.* They declared that their crossing the Sutlej would be as meritorious as a pilgrimage to the holy Ganges. They did not like the movements of the British troops, although it was within their rights to move forces in their own country towards the frontier. Daily they passed such wishes as news. Occurrence of bloodshed by the Sikh troops was consequently expected.

➤ **One day the Maharani in the presence of the courtiers and officers declared to the men of every brigade and dera that she had reconciled her mind to the murder of her brother, Sardar Jawahar Singh. She wished them (the soldiers) to obey her as sons; she harbored no ill-will towards them. Jawahar Singh had been, indeed, foolish and incompetent in the discharge of State duties.*

She appointed Sardar Tej Singh, a famous veteran to command the *Fauj-i-Gair-Ain*. The administration of the country, too, was clearly explained. The mutinies among the troops resulted in confusion, loss of State income and disorder on the frontier. The soldiers readily believed any rumor. Summaries of any news received from the various parts of the dominion and any dispatch received from Rai Kishan Chand, their trusted Vakil, would be communicated to them (the army). The Maharaja Dalip Singh was a minor. The protection of the lives and property of the people and regard for their own livelihood should rest upon the army. They were both subjects and guardians. Since they had gone astray, *they would be required to declare in writing at the Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whose salt they had eaten, that they would obey their officers in every thing and would execute the orders of the Sarkar under all circumstances.* As customary among the Khalsa, Kara Parshad (sweets) would be distributed among them. Four months' salary would be paid to them and they would be

required to retire to camp 100 kroh from Lahore, and should refrain from high-handedness. If they settled down peacefully, order in the country and tranquility on the frontier could be assured, as in the reign of the Great Maharaja.

➤ *Their insubordination gave the glorious Sahibs evidence of the disorganization in the kingdom of Lahore, so that (the British) were determined to reinforce the frontier. The troops agreed to go to the Samadh of the Great Maharaja and declare in writing that they would obey their officers and camp some kroh away from Lahore according to the orders of the Rani; and on the 9th of Maghar (22nd November, 1845) they gave this promise. It was further ordered that a letter containing the proceedings should be sent to Rai Kishan Chand, who should be asked if this satisfied the British.*

The irregular cavalry, who were in complete agreement with the regular army in their acts of omission and commission, learned of the arrangement that the troops were to be stationed at a distance from Lahore, and expected that they could move easily and perform their duties from any place. So they went to Raja Lal Singh and their officers and requested their transfer as well. It was approved; and they were ordered to Manala and Bahdana to settle quietly there in groups. Accordingly the cavalry, with the batteries of Maghi Kaban, Amir Chand and Raja Lal Singh left Lahore on the 11th Maghar (24th November, 1845) and on the first day reached Shalabag and Amb Daturah. After two more marches they arrived at Manala and Bhadana, where they were stationed in groups. The *Fauj-i-Khas*, and the brigades of Sardar Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh were encamped in the plain of Mian Mir from 10 —14 Maghar (23rd —27th November, 1845). After receiving their pay on the 15th Maghar (28th November, 1845), the *Fauj-i-Khas* was stationed at Malikpur. The brigades of Sardar Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh were ordered to Rora and the brigade of Rattan Singh Mann was ordered to Dhaori. On the 16th Maghar (29th November, 1845) communication was set up by local Sikhs between the brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas* and the dera (group) of cavalry, which were encamped some krohs apart so that they could act together.

➤ *In every dera signs of insolence on the part of the soldiers reappeared as if no solemn written assurance had been given at the Samadh of the Great Maharaja.* Observing this the senior officers instructed the juniors to discipline the troops, reminding them of their solemn promise of obedience and rude conduct, and the purpose for which they were stationed there. But these orders had a contrary effect. The troops of every brigade in the camp retorted by committing further irregularities. Everywhere the officers were summoned by the troops, who asserted that the British garrison at Ferozepur, which was inadequate, was receiving reinforcements from Hindustan. There was at that place a sum of Rs.18 lacs held in trust from Raja Suchet Singh and such other treasure. All the brigades and deras of the Sikhs, regular and irregular, had therefore decided to march upon Ferozepur. The brigades stationed in the Manjah territory, at Lahore and at Shahdara had also agreed to this plan.

➤ *It was impossible to dissuade them and indeed any who attempted to do so would be adequately dealt with. In short, the whole army on this side of the Sutlej was to be mobilized. They would cross to Ferozepur, seize the treasure lying there and, until they occupied Delhi, they would observe the strictest Hindu vows. They would take the revenue of London itself from the British.*

Becoming aware that the entire army was bent upon mischief the officers feared for their lives and honor. They decided among themselves that the officers of every brigade and dera should keep each other informed, if the insubordination of the troops threatened their safety. Some Sikh officers who were kinsmen of the soldiers were made to understand that their conduct was not approved and they were warned to be more prudent. It was expected that this warning would be circulated among the soldiers. The discussion between the officers and the troops followed these lines.

It was asserted that the Great Maharaja, who had acquired vast resources, had the greatest regard for the friendship of the English, as was known the world over, and that it was evident that he had extended ship. He had entertained every employee of the Company in a befitting

manner and sought in every way to confirm the friendship between the two governments, never dreaming of encroaching upon Ferozepur or other British territories. The troops agreed that this was so, but that by the time the Khalsa (the Sikh army) had developed its full strength and had become capable of open combat, the Great Maharaja had become aged and lost his vigor. Somebody then asked them if they now intended to show their valor by sacrificing themselves, since such a war meant bloodshed and slaughter, whether their proposal included obedience the order of their master to cross the river. They replied that by the order of the Khalsa they had unanimously decided to march across the Sutlej. Somebody asked them if Rs.18 lakhs, which was held in trust from Raja Suchet Singh belonged to the government of the Punjab or to the army which had now become its master.

It was suggested that the treasure could not be procured without the consent of Raja Gulab Singh, brother of Raja Suchet Singh and that the Sikhs should stay their hand. ➤ They replied that they would seize that wealth and also the British treasure.

When told that in crossing the Sutlej they would break a long-standing alliance, an act which required deep consideration, they recklessly answered that the Cis-Sutlej territory also belonged to the Lahore government. The Khalsa had great ambitions for which it was fully equipped. Their part was to achieve them. Even if they were destined to defeat their request was granted, they could afterwards go back to their lands. *They were reminded of the solemn oath that they had given in writing at the Samadh of the Great Raja*, which had been sent to Rai Kishan Chand with the expectation that a satisfactory reply would come from him. To this they retorted that they would not be satisfied unless their claims were conceded. They were told that such talk and schemes were futile; the fort at Ferozepur was filled with war material and a large garrison. The troops resented these warnings.

They were told that the British were the rulers of the whole world and possessed a vast territory, army, cleverness, courage and treasure, and that it

was impossible to oppose them. On the contrary, it would be easier for them (the British) to capture the Punjab, because Ferozepur was hardly 40 krohs from Lahore and Amritsar. But it would be extremely difficult for them (the Sikhs) to take Ferozepur and Ludhiana. On hearing such statements the troops abused the men who made them in public or private committees and gatherings of the Sikh troops. The officers (who shared Such views) were rudely denounced in the were rudely denounced in the committees and gatherings of the Sikh troops. At this time the infantry brigades were stationed at five towns and the cavalry, which had marched before the *Fauj-i-Ain* was encamped at twelve places at the towns of Bhadana and Sur Singh. But all advice by their comrades and exhortation by the officers had no effect on the troops. It produced no other result than the exchange of hot words and the revelation of their short-sightedness and lack of understanding and the further disorganization of government and menaces of blows and death to the officers. After discussion among the sections of the army, the *Fauj-i-Ain* decided to march from its present stations to Qadian in the Manjah territory and to the east of the Sutlej, and on the 24th Maghar (7th December, 1845), it set forth, some of them, in two stages and others in three stages, reaching Qadian, where they assembled. The soldiers of the *Fauj-i-Ain* sent sowars (horse soldiers) to collect boats and bring them to this side of the crossing at Harike. The irregular cavalry had followed them in defiance of the orders of their officers whom they abused, and threatened with maltreatment and death. A few sowars selected from each dera proposed that they should encamp at Barwala. *On their way they sacked the villages as if they were in enemy territory.* If anyone protested that this was not Yusafzai territory or neighborhood of Peshawar they replied that the Sikh army had always plundered those regions and to do the same for once in their home country mattered little; so they took grain at their own price, cut trees for fuel and indiscriminately confiscated fodder for their horses from those villages. If one of the troops' camels fell ill or was injured, they would take an officer's camel, if he had two. The officer dared not protest. If some Zamindar came to a large tent, taking it to be that of an officer, to lodge a complaint, the officer had his curtains lowered, out of fear, and sent the

man to identify the soldier, who had wronged him and then report. The offender would hide himself; or, if found, would deny the offense done. Even if the case was proved only one-tenth of the goods was returned. Everywhere they evaded check in the same way. Many inhabitants had grievances against the army and cursed their oppressors and wished for their destruction. If soldiers belonging to the locality were present, it was not plundered. At such places things were purchased at a nominal price. The irregulars stationed at Bhadana, Nurpur and Naushahra looted the district with little restraint. Some resident official opposed these outrages. In consequence a quarrel broke out and the villagers suffered great loss. Raja Lal Singh tried his best to intervene, but in vain and compensated the villagers from his own pocket. One or two soldiers who had been put under arrest were released by their comrades, who took the law into their own hands.

Raja Lal Singh and the officers were abused by the army, and threatened with death or degradation and forbidden to interfere. The soldiers removed the autumn harvest wherever they found it lying in the fields and carried away fodder from the houses of the zamindars. Sardar Ganda Singh Kunjahia was secretly sent by Raja Lal Singh to chide the officers of the *Fauj-i-Ain* for their failure to control the men.

The sowars of the irregular army joined their comrades in the regular army. They reported that the irregular cavalry had arrived at a shallow place to cross the river. They were asked if there were boats available for the Sikhs of the *Fauj-i-Ain* to transport their artillery. They were told that regular sowars (horse soldiers) had gone towards Harike to collect boats. They should bring along their guns and boats would be procured; but more brigades should be brought from Lahore to that place. During the two days 24th and 25th Maghar (7th-8th December 1845) they halted at Qadian.

The first question which the soldiers asked each other was whether all the officers were present; and they confirmed that all of them were there. On learning this they congratulated themselves, declaring that the officers were so helpless that they had no other alternative, unless they took to the

air or went underground. If they should desert, the homes of all of them would be at the mercy of the troops. After venting their relief they reaffirmed the need to keep a close watch on the officers. They said that delay in sending troops from Lahore was a subterfuge and that in return for every place (handed over to the British) the officers were to receive payment from the Sarkar of the Company Bahadur. It was suspected that the officers and the State authorities were in league with the Sarkar Company.

They argued that the Hindustani and Malwai officers had their homes across the Sutlej and, were therefore, favorably inclined towards the British and so wished to frighten them by praising the greatness of the British. But the Khorasanis (Afghans), who had been defeated by the Sikhs, had in turn driven the British out of Kabul. *Again, as the wealth of all the officers, like that of Raja Suchet Singh, was at Ferozepur, they opposed the advance of the Sikh army, lest it should be plundered. They were also afraid of losing their own lives.* They declared in the face of the officers that they (the soldiers) received only Rs.12 a month in pay, while they (the officers; got thousands of rupees per year, so that there was no reason for the officers to hesitate in declaring war. The officers submissively replied that everything was in the hands of the army and that they (the officers) only wished them to act to their advantage.

In the meantime Sikh recruits began to pour into the deras from the Manjha hoping to share in the plunder of Ferozepur. It was also said that after the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej they would be joined by the Sikhs of the Malwa, who would swell their numbers, because they already had many relatives in the Sikh army.

On the 26th Maghar (9th December, 1845) the brigade of the *Fauj-i-Khas* and the brigades of Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh marched to Jhangi, about three kroh from Qadian on this side of the river. They then proposed that according to plan, the irregular army should advance to the river to the right of the crossing at Harike, east of which lay Ferozepur, and announce their arrival to those at Ferozepore. After consultation

among themselves, they advised their officers that heavy fire should be opened. The officers replied that they might do what they pleased, since everything was in their hands. So heavy fire was opened that night, which it was presumed would be heard at Ferozepur and by the regular army. Two days afterwards, that is, on the 28th Maghar (11th December, 1845) all three brigades marched from Jhangi to Nathianwala on the bank of Sutlej towards Harike on the road from Ferozepur. The soldiers in a body demanded of the officers an assurance in writing that a wounded man should receive his pay as usual and that the pay of any one who should be killed should be handed to his heirs, to a son or brother, if there were one. The officers replied that that was not within their power, but that they would petition the Sarkar to that effect.

Accordingly they obtained from the officers a petition with seals affixed and kept it as a record. They said that the officers were without matchlocks and that each of them should carry one like the soldiers for without a rifle an officer could not light. The officers agreed; and so they and the men were equal. *That day the officers who were chagrined at their helplessness before an insubordinate army, held a secret meeting. They deplored that they were about to commit a breach of faith; that after crossing the river a battle would ensue; that the power, resources and conquering capacity of the British Government were known all over India.*

They deplored it all the more, that there was no reason in their favor; and obviously they would break the alliance which the Great Maharaja had respected throughout his life.

At that time the men asked the officers why they did not give orders as they used to do in the days of the Great Maharaja, absentees should be put under arrest and discipline should be enforced as before. Parades should be ordered as was being done at Ferozepur during those days. Roll-call should also be introduced. Hearing this, the officers were at first surprised. They said among themselves that such questions from their men were a good sign. To humor the men, they replied that those officers had joined service during the time of the Great Maharaja, just as among the men there were those who had done long service and those recently

recruited; so among the officers there were old and new. They would try to arrive at a decision among themselves and communicate it to the men. *They tried to make the men realize that in the opinion of the whole world the Great Maharajah's death was a calamity for Punjab; he had bequeathed to the country a united and effective government. He raised an army of its own inhabitants in order to maintain prosperity. He foresaw that his subjects would have the interest of the State more at heart than his descendants or successors.* He had concluded the treaty with the Company Bahadur; and it was meant to be carefully; observed from generation to generation. Now everything rested in their hands. Maharaja Dalip Singh was very young and little concerned with affairs. They fully agreed with the men as to the necessity for discipline, regular parades, the taking of roll-call and punishment of defaulters; after all, this had been their life-work.

After expressing these wishes to their officers they requested them to pluck up courage and restore the old discipline in the army. The officers felt gratified with the answer and told the men that if they wished to maintain the reputation of the Great Maharaja, and preserve his achievements, *they should obey the orders of the officers, and these orders were emphatically that they should desist from crossing the river breaking the long-standing alliance. Afterwards they would rue having done so. They could do what they liked in the trans-Sutlej territory. On hearing this all those present, numbering about 2,000, replied with one voice that they would obey all orders, except that to refrain from crossing the river.*

Immediately afterwards the various groups of men who were present dispersed, saying that after taking their meals they would bring their officers to inspect the bridges. The officers looked at each other in amazement and went to their deras. After taking their meals men from every brigade went to the river to inspect the proposed bridges, carrying their officers with them as if dead. They found that the space between the camp and the bank of the river consisted of sand, marsh and shallow water, so they changed their mind about camping there and returned after having inspected the bridge, which existed in name only, for there was only one boat, over which was set a guard. On the 29th Maghar (12th

December, 1845) an English officer with 100 sowars had come from the direction of Ferozepur to reconnoiter the bridge, and the guard on the boat fired at them. On the same day twelve more boats were brought by sowars specially sent for the purpose and these were equally divided among the troops of Mehtab Singh, Bahadur Singh and the *Fauj-i-Khas*. It was learned from the Sikhs who had come from their homes or had lagged behind, that on the following day the banner of the brigades of Rattan Singh would also reach the bridge. Eleven more boats were received. After some discussion about their distribution among the brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh, they began to cross the river on the 1st Poh (14th December, 1845).

While the three brigades were crossing the river, the brigade of Rattan Singh Mao also reached the bridge and using the boats of all three brigades which returned from the other bank of river Sutlej, began to cross the river. By mid-day of the 2nd Poh (15th December, 1845) all the three brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh had completely crossed over. One boat sank and the men and material in it were lost. The brigades of Rattan Singh Man had hardly crossed, when the banners of the brigades of Kanh Singh Man and Sardar Shamsheer Singh Sandhanwalia, along with the Sikh volunteers, arrived there. On reaching the crossing place they seized the same boats. On the 2nd Poh (15th December, 1845), the brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, Mehtab Singh, Bahadur Singh and Rattan Singh Man had crossed to the other side of the river towards Ferozepur. (*A certain Zamindar, son of the Ghaudhari of Mastike was killed on that day by a soldier, to pay off an old score*).

On the 3rd Poh (16th December, 1845), the brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, Mehtab Singh, Bahadur Singh and Rattan Singh Man marched from the neighborhood of Mastike and encamped between the town of Attari and the stream called Sukhne, three and half kroh from Ferozepur. The irregular cavalry, taking the artillery with it, crossed the river in boats from Harike and encamped on the bank. After one halt, they made a forced march and reached the neighborhood of Mullanwala. It had been

arranged that each *dera* of the Sikhs should be kept informed about the movements of the others. Accordingly as soon as the Sikhs of the regular army informed the irregular army about the advance of certain brigades towards Ferozepore on Poh 3 (16th December, 1845), some hundreds of *sowars* of the cavalry brought Raja Lal Singh and other officers to the camp of the regular army and made an agreement with the Sikh soldiers that on the following day, Poh 4 (17th December, 1845), the camp of the irregular troops should join the regular army. Subsequently a plan of action would be decided upon. On their way back Raja Lal Singh and his officers tactfully met the officers of the *Fauj-i-Ain* in the open ground to decide about the amalgamation of the *dera*. He referred to a copy of a letter of the British Government, which had stated that the results of the breach of the alliance and the crossing of the army to the other side of the Sutlej would be disastrous for the Lahore Sarkar. It was also made clear that the intention of the government of the Company was merely to strengthen the frontier defenses. He (Raja Lal Singh) also invited their attention to the despatch of Rai Kishan Chand in which he expressed great surprise at the crossing and breach of alliance without any ostensible reason. He (Kishan Chand) had also pointed out that no good would come of such a foolhardy action of the Sikh army now or in the future. He (Raja Lal Singh) also mentioned the order of the *Sarkar* which required them (the officers) by every possible means to prevent the troops from crossing to the other side of the river. So long as they should remain on the trans-Sutlej side towards Manjah everything could be controlled. He (Raja Lal Singh) added his own conviction, that both the regular and irregular troops seemed to rival each other in shortsightedness, in their desire for war and their haste. Both were set upon the breach of the alliance. He stated that even if at that time they would withdraw towards Manjah there would still be hope for safety. The officers of the regular and irregular army declared in the presence of Raja Lal Singh that they had tried their best to dissuade the army since they marched from their first camp and at every subsequent halt. They said that on the following day in the joint camp of the regular and irregular troops they would once more say all they could if they could be heard. Otherwise everything would rest with the troops.

At that time the officers of the irregular troops reported that they had learned from a camel driver who arrived with some papers, that Sardar Tej Singh, the Commander-in-Chief, had ordered the brigade of Mewa Singh Majithia to Dera Ismail Khan. Accordingly, that brigade was encamped at Shahdara. Besides, the Panches of the brigades who had gone to Jammu had come back and reported that Raja Gulab Singh had said that he would leave for Lahore on receipt of an invitation from the Sarkar, but that he was not prepared to comply with their verbal message. The said brigade and the Sikhs of the other brigades had a letter written, under menaces, to the effect that Raja Gulab Singh should be sent for, and despatched it. The same brigade, after consultation among themselves, obtained orders from the Sarkar by force to join the rest of the army and by their own will, marched to join it. At last Sardar Tej Singh himself saw that the brigade of Mewa Singh might create trouble at Lahore and realized that the brigades of Kanh Singh Man, Shamsheer and Chattar Singh were disaffected towards him (Tej Singh). He therefore decided to move from Lahore. On that day Poh 3 (16th December, 1845) after the crossing of the artillery of Rattan Singh Man, first the brigade of Kanh Singh and then in turn the brigades of Shamsheer Singh and Chattar Singh decided to cross the river. At that stage the officers despaired of dissuading the troops. They found that all the Sikh troops from there to Shahdara were unanimous; so they dispersed. On the morning of the 4th Poh (17th December, 1845), the irregular army, Raja Lal Singh, his artillery and the four brigades encamped on this side of the Sukhne stream. The officers of the regular and irregular army met groups from every brigade and camp gathered at the camp of Raja Lal Singh. The officers intended to talk about the papers which had come from Lahore, when the men, who had got news of the arrival of papers on seeing the camel driver, asked them (the officers) if the papers had reached them. Raja Lal Singh and the officers of both the regular and irregular troops seized the opportunity and to humor the troops, asked whether they would like to know about those papers in detail or in brief. The men replied that the papers had been read by them (the officers) and that they should let them know their substance. Being afraid of the men, the officers reported only the gist of the despatch

of the British Government, the letter of Rai Kishen Chand and the despatch of the Sarkar demanding to know why the men wanted to cross the Sutlej and break the alliance. The Sikhs replied that the contents of the despatch were misrepresented and intended to deceive them. They had received reliable and authentic reports from the Sikhs who had come from the Malwa (Cis-Sutlej) territory and it was certain that the British troops were shortly due to arrive there. The insubordinate troops began to plan among themselves for the combat.

➤ Raja Lal Singh and all the officers, high and low, were overawed by the soldiers. Sometimes the men came to them and made proposals for the battle. At others, being displeased with their cold reply that everything rested with the men, they abused them.

On the 5th Poh (18th December, 1845) it was learned that the Governor-General was advancing with large reinforcements by way of Mudki to Ferozepur. The Sikhs proposed that Raja Lal Singh, the cavalry and the three brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh should march from there and should encamp opposite the Governor-General. Sardar Tej Singh Bahadur and the brigades of Kanh Singh Man, Sardar Shamsheer Singh, Chattar Singh, Mewa Singh and the artillery and regiments which were on their way to cross the Sutlej and were to join them there were required to remain there for the purpose of attacking Ferozepur; while the brigade of Rattan Singh Man and some other troops which were to be left there according to requirements would join Sardar Tej Singh in addition to his own brigades. On the same day instead of a general march they decided to beat the drums five times.

The brigade of Rattan Singh Man, the artillery and some other troops remained there. Raja Lal Singh marched with the cavalry, the brigade of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, the brigade of Mehtab Singh and the brigade of Bahadur Singh. Although it was a moonlit night, yet on account of disorder among the soldiers they lost their way, The village of Sultan Khan, which lay on the way, was set on fire by the Sikhs in order to warm themselves, so that the place was destroyed.

A little before daybreak they reached Pheroshahr, where they encamped around the big walls of the place which formed a fort. To the west, opposite Ferozepur, was the *Fauj-i-Khas*; and from the south to the north-east, in the direction of the road to Mudki and Jira (or Zira), the brigades of Mehtab Singh, Bahadur Singh, the irregular forces and the batteries and howitzers attached to them were encamped. Raja Lal Singh and the officers were in the irregular forces and the batteries and howitzers attached to them were encamped. Raja Lal Singh and the officers were in the center. As the men had lost their way, they wandered like a caravan.

Ganda Singh Nihang, the officer in charge of the Mihangs confident that the horse could go anywhere on earth and could cover any distance, arrived in the neighborhood of Mudki. There they captured an Englishman and some servants who had arrived there in the train of the Governor-General and sent them to the Sikh camp. They intimated the arrival of the *dera* of the Nawab as soon as possible. All the Sikh soldiers were fatigued on account of their having lost their way throughout the night. Some were still joining up from behind. It was announced that half the troops would take to the field. But the soldiers who were fit enough to move made up only half their numbers, and these went, taking Raja Lal Singh and the officers of the regular and irregular troops with them. The cavalry and the men of the brigades of Mehtab Singh, Bahadur Singh and the *Fauj-i-Khas* followed in that order. The *dera* of the Governor-General had arrived at Mudki.

On receipt of the news of the arrival of the Sikh army, the (British) regiments and artillery prepared for action and advanced about one *kroh*. The Sikhs opened fire first and the British guns replied. Some riderless horses from a British regiment opposite the Sikh cavalry got out of control and galloped into the Sikh lines, killing some of the Sikhs, but others fired, thinking that British cavalry were charging them. In the confusion which followed they fell into panic and fled firing in all directions. In reply the British sent over shells of various kinds.

The land between the two armies was overgrown with large bushes, trees and hedges so that the two armies could not see each other clearly.

Bahadur Singh's brigade was the first to face the British forces with guns and matchlocks and was defeated. Similarly the *Fauj-i-Khas* with its artillery joined the battle, but after a couple of hours they also were thrown back. At dusk the British forces were facing Mehtab Singh's brigade who thought that the *Fauj-i-Khas* had arrived. In their relief they shouted "*Fateh Wah Guru*" (*Victory to our Guru*) whereupon the British troops opened fire on them with guns and muskets. The men of Mehtab Singh's brigade replied with two rounds from their guns and a little dispirited rifle fire and then broke. When night fell, the British troops still held their ground. The Sikhs retired from the field, abandoning some of their guns, and withdrew to Pheroshahr camp. The regular and irregular cavalry had brought their baggage on mules and ponies and in their flight from the British, they had to abandon much of their baggage and ammunition.

The battle occurred on the 6th Poh (19th December, 1845), at the Pheroshahr camp. There was much mutual recrimination among the Sikh troops. The soldiers said that they were defeated because they had made a double march and had lost their way and arrived tired. Moreover, the reinforcement of the other half of their army had not reached them according to plan. And above all night had fallen on them. Those who had remained in the camp, on account of losing their way, said that they (the vanquished) had shown themselves to be worthless. They boasted that they would show their own mettle in the next battle and would do wonders. And so the quarrel went on.

On the morning of 9th Poh (22nd December, 1845), news was brought that the Nawab Governor-General Bahadur's army had drawn off to the left Beraha, south of the Sikh camp, towards Ferozepur, and were to be replaced by fresh troops on that day. The Sikhs were misled into rejoicing at this, thinking that the British had taken shelter in the fort at Ferozepur and were trying to evade them. The cavalry abused Raja Lal Singh and set out in search of plunder, taking him and the officers with them. Some regiments of the regular army also marched out, believing that a baggage train was exposed and would be an easy prey for them.

But they did not take the heavy guns with them as they were with the infantry. When they received the news that a British force was on the march nearby, the regular infantry demanded of their officers that they should seize such a good opportunity for loot. The officers replied that they could do what they liked, but that the news was of a movement of British troops from Ferozepur. On hearing this two battalions of the *Fauj-i-Khas* with their artillery, went west by their own will. A beggar appeared who said he was a servant of Bokhan Khan in the cavalry, and reported to the Khalsa troops that one British force had come from Ferozepur and another from Mudki and the two had joined. One of the Sikhs said that this force might have come to escort the army of Nawab Governor General Bahadur to Ferozepur, that arms and ammunition were probably being distributed among the British troops. On hearing this the Khalsa soldiers said that the British force with the Governor-General had probably been bringing reinforcements to Ferozepur. On learning this the two battalions of *Fauj-i-Khas* returned to camp. The irregular cavalry, which had gone southwest, and the regular regiments, which had marched west also returned, leaving some *sowars* to reconnoiter.

The men of the regular and irregular regiments were angry that the indolence of the officers had lost them an opportunity of plundering the English camp.

➤ *They spoke roughly to Raja Lal Singh and the officers and accused them of aiding the British. The higher officers were oppressed by the thought that they were going to die so futilely. With tears in their eyes they repeated the name of the Great Maharaja, saying that he had trained the regular and irregular troops at great cost and with great care and had also scrupulously maintained friendship with the English. But the treaty had been broken by their folly and the army was going to its destruction, while they were quite helpless in their humiliation.*

The cavalry were very bitter against Raja Lal Singh and their officers and the whole camp began to plot injury to them. The men of the regular army assembled deputies from every company and from the batteries of

Bahadur Singh's brigade, which was on the left, to arrange a plot to seize and beat and murder their officers. Deputies from Mehtab Singh's brigade on the right also joined the plot...

They went in the afternoon to the 4th battalion of the regular army which was called Sham Sota, to bind, beat and kill their officers, when suddenly shells from the big guns of the British began to fall among the brigade of the *Fauj-i-Khas*, the Sikhs all stood at once to attention. When the British force appeared opposite them, the guns of the *Fauj-i-Khas* opened fire and the army occupied a trench which they had dug in front of their camp. The *Fauj-i-Khas* prided themselves that under the command of their French officers they had been victorious everywhere in the Punjab. This battle against the British, they thought, would be like their earlier battles. Not doubting the ultimate result and unfamiliar with war against the British, they repeated their earlier boasts, saying that men would see their deeds. At first they opened a steady bombardment with their batteries. Then they opened musketry fire from the trench. Their officers were not allowed to act as such. Everyone followed his own will. The British advanced the left flank of their army against the *Fauj-i-Ain* and drove it back towards the camp of the cavalry, which also possessed guns and howitzers. Battle was also joined with the cavalry on the right. The *Fauj-i-Khas* had to face the right flank of the British, which steadily advanced. The brigades of the *Fauj-i-Khas* and the cavalry were heavily shelled with a variety of projectiles and suffered severe losses in men, horses, artillery, oxen and transport animals. The British guns fired rapidly and were served with skill and courage. Their sound at any distance was quite different from that of the Sikh guns, which were fired by means of a string. Shells rained on the Sikhs and so many of them were wounded that by afternoon their spirit was broken. When they witnessed the strength and discipline of the British they were forced to confess that the British proceeded with set purpose, while they themselves were chaotic, and it became apparent to them that the British were advancing against them at first like a flood in a river and later like the tide in the ocean.

The Sikh regular and irregular armies were encamped around the village of Pheroshahr, but fled in whatever direction they could. In their confusion and panic they could not help one another. The Sikh cavalry, which had proudly declared that it had formed the vanguard in every battle, could not advance against the British guns. Some of them, however, fought alongside their own artillery as long and hard as they could; but others turned and fled carrying their own baggage and that of others, lest it should fall into the hands of the English. Raja Lal Singh's camp and that of the artillery which lay east of the village, were completely plundered. Camp-followers who had come with the vain hope of looting.

Ferozepur, found the Sikhs in retreat, plundered the goods of their fellow countrymen and fled. Suddenly the magazine of the *Fauj-i-Khas* was exploded by a shell from a British gun. Not only were they terribly shaken by this catastrophe, but also many were killed and the Sikh battalions and batteries suffered a complete defeat. The British troops occupied the camp of the *Fauj-i-Khas* and cavalry as it stood. The darkness of that night was as the life of the vanquished. Raja Lal Singh was wounded and a fugitive. All those belonging to the *Fauj-i-Khas* and cavalry who had not fled lay wounded or dead on the field. Some men of the *Fauj-i-Khas* joined the brigades of Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh, which were on the left. At night the English troops retired according to custom; for in the dark, friend could not be distinguished from foe, though they had completely defeated their opponents. Huge fires were lit up at intervals opposite the camp of the Sikhs of the brigades of Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh and the other remnants of the defeated army. The Sikhs thought that the British were resting, so they fired some shells in their direction at intervals during the night. Those who were left in the Sikh camp discussed throughout the night whether they should disperse, or collect their artillery and set up the dera again elsewhere. But hourly their numbers were dwindling. That night, when the *Fauj-i-Khas* and the cavalry had been defeated and the remnant had fled, the officers, who had been disgusted with the ill conduct, insolence, disobedience, heedlessness and abusive tone of the men, moved about among the soldiers who were

running away and throne of Delhi, according to the sayings of the Gurus, and destroying London, sneered that, far from capturing the fort at Ferozepur with its treasure and the and taking a sacred bath in the Ganges and reaping the fruits of their religious war, they had gained nothing by their aggression. They asked these Sikhs who, when marching wilfully from near Lahore, were entreated by their officers faithfully to observe the treaty with the Company as it had been maintained by Maharaja Ranjit Singh; and had retorted that by the time the Maharaja had grown old and infirm the Sikh people had become strong — what had become of that strength today. It was indeed the traditional policy of the late Maharaja not to become involved in war against the British. But if anyone, aware of the power of the Company, entreated the men to refrain from crossing the river and breaking the treaty, to the destruction of the State of the Punjab, the Sikhs regarded him as blind and opposed to their interest. They became offensive to their officers taunting them that they were merely afraid of being killed in the battle.

But on that day the truth had been revealed, the strength and valor of the British army had been proved. And not one of those foolish Sikhs unless he could recover his obsession by chattering with his comrades could offer a reply. In this way the officers freely gave vent to their feelings.

On the 10th Poh (23rd December, 1845), after sunrise the British army returned to the attack. The brigades of Mehtab Singh and Bahadur Singh opened fire, but the British wheeled to the right and left and bombarded the Sikhs in such a way that they broke and fled as their comrades had fled on the previous night, with whatever they could carry with them, and made their way towards the Sutlej, leaving none except the wounded and disabled at Pheroshabr. On the previous night, the 9th Poh (22nd December, 1845), the brigades of Kanh Singh Man, Sardar Shamsher Singh, Chatter Singh, Mewa Singh, and the artillery, which had begun to cross the river since the 3rd Poh (16th December), joined the brigade of Rattan Singh Man and the rest of the troops. They had Sardar Tej Singh with them. On learning about the battle of Pheroshahr and hearing the

noise of cannon fire, they hastened with Sardar Tej Singh to help the troops opposite Ferozepur and arrived early on the 10th Poh (23rd December). Some *sowars* were sent to bring news of the Sikh army. They reported that the Singhs had fled and that the British army had arrived at Pheroshahr and occupied the camp. An artillery battle from a distance ensued between the guns attached to the British cavalry and Sardar Tej Singh's brigade, which formed the vanguard. This brigade got the news that on learning of the defeat at Pheroshahr, all the brigades had decided to give battle with the Sutlej at their back. So they all encamped at the village of Sultan Khan where that brigade also returned after the combat with the British. It was two and half distant. The British troops encamped at Pheroshahr on the 11th Poh (24th December); the Sikh army marched from Sultan Khan to the bank of the Sutlej, leaving large quantities of ordnance stores and ammunition at the camping ground and on the way on account of bad organization and nervousness. In several marches they crossed the river towards Sobranh. Those who had been defeated at Pheroshahr fled in various directions

THE END

by Ajudhia Prashad

<https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.282842/page/n57/mode/1up>

**... Fueled by corruption and bottomless greed, The Collapse of Empire happens when a rampant Military cannot be controlled, but engages in military adventures that accelerates its collapse... be it Greece, Rome, Napoleonic France, Hitler's Germany, the great Great Britain, or the U.S.A.*

UMDAT-UT-TAWARIKH Volume 4 Intro (pp xxii)

The account in the “*Roznamcha*” goes on normally till the middle of September 1845; when the Khalsa army which had been, since sometime, usurping the executive authority had now formally assumed the Government of the State under the designation, as Sohan Lal tells us, of the “Panth Khalsa Jeo”.

The new seal of authority which this Panchayat government used for sending out orders and communications was inscribed with the words ‘Akal Sahai’ (God the Helper). ➤ ***The name of Maharaja Dalip Singh or that of his mother, Rani Jind Kaur, was dropped from official communications.*** It was under this new dispensation that between the 19th and 21st September, minister Jawahar Singh and his sister, the Queen-mother Rani Jind Kaur, were summoned to appear before the ‘Panth Khalsa Jeo’.

With Jawahar Singh’s assassination the details in Sohan Lai’s book become meager; and two months later begins the war with the British. ➤ ***It is so unfortunate that the portion (Daftar) of the book dealing with war and the events immediately preceding it were borrowed by Sir Herbert Edwardes but never returned.*** Then comes the last portion of the book which deals with the last phase of the Khalsa Raj.

Sohan Lal continues his practice of recording day to day’s proceedings of the Lahore Darbar; but one does not fail to notice the difference in the Pre-war and the Post-war record of news in the *Roznamcha*. Firstly, the jottings of the news is *brief and sketchy*, and secondly the Darbar had altogether changed its complexion. *It is now an Anglo-Sikh Darbar*. In place of Maharaja, the central authority is now occupied by *The English Resident* who presides over the daily meeting. Around him are some of his senior British assistants in places which, in the Pre-war days, were occupied by the distinguished sons of the soil of the Punjab.

When the second war broke out as the result of the local troubles in Multan and Hazara, we gather from the pages of Sohan Lal’s *Roznamcha* that the British Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, kept firm in his saddle of authority at Lahore and

as before kept on directing the Regency Council to carry out his orders. According to all cannons of war and international practice, two things were necessary (i) that declaration of war should have been made and (ii) that the representative of a belligerent party should have been recalled from the country of the other belligerent or else he should have been pushed out. But in this case neither of these two things happened. In fact, we understand from Sohan Lal that when the British Commander-in-Chief arrived in Lahore with the army of invasion, Sir Frederick Currie issued a Proclamation that he, (C-in-C*) had come to restore order and peace in the Kingdom and punish those who had gone in revolt against the authority of the young Maharaja. He invited and successfully seduced some of the chiefs to desert the cause of Sher Singh and earn the favor and gratitude of their own government.

Even in the brief sketchy account of the second war, its causes, and how and why the British won it, Sohan Lal gives us some important facts. ➤ ***His account leaves an impression on the mind of the reader that Mr. Currie had completely established a reign of terror in the Punjab*** from April 1848 to March 1849; (ii) ***fully exploited some of the inherent weaknesses in the character of our people; and*** (iii) ***by frowns and favors, kept the governing classes or the chiefs on his side;*** and made use of them (a) in maintaining clear the line of communication for the British troops between the field of battle and their base of operations beyond the Sutlej, (b) arranged for the purchase and transport within the Punjab of provisions for the invading British army even when the Punjabi troops of Raja Sher Singh Attariwala were actually starving for food. The arsenals, magazine stores, gun-powder dumps, and the treasure chests of the Lahore State were placed by this officer (even though he had no locus standi during the war) at the disposal of the invading British army. ➤ ***And there were not few, but many who helped the British in winning the war and after annexation, were duly rewarded and honored by them for their services.***

Sohan Lal's voluminous work enables us to form a comprehensive view of the important theme 'How the Khalsa were able to build a Sovereign State in the Punjab, and how soon after the demise of its principal builder, it lost sovereignty (1748-1849). The narrative brings out, though not so objectively, some of the

very glaring weaknesses of our people, which had cost them their Freedom. We are further given to understand that it was not only the people who had some monetary stakes in the country that had actively cooperated with the British; but even the bulk of the population were indifferent to the results of the war.

The change of government in favor of the British, if not welcome, at least did not seem to have disturbed them. *We had lost, it appears, all sense of political nationality and public spirit and, overwhelmed by desire of personal gain, felt little urge to render assistance in its maintenance and integration. We had our parish first, and the country later. Now, if History really has a function to dis- charge in the political economy of a nation's life, it is to beware its present generation, of what happened in the past, and show them the way how to avoid those mistakes, so that the future is secured.*

Sita Ram Kohli July 1961

THE END

https://archive.org/details/UMDAT-UT-TAWARIKH_Volume_4/page/n36/mode/1up

SIKH RESEARCH INSTITUTE:

My profound thanks to Harinder Singh Co-Founder & Senior Fellow of Sikh RI and Punjab Digital Library, and Santbir Singh - Research Associate, for Illuminating THE TRUTH about Rani Jindan Kaur, that has evaded so many others!

“Getting to Know Rani Jindan”: Podcast: <https://sikhri.org/ranijindkaur>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fil1BrFgEUo>

“You decide... Was Rani Jind Kaur on the side of the Sikhs or the British?”..... <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLCTw47Wgfl>